

Private Sector Involvement in Regenerating Social Housing Estates: a review of recent practice in Dublin

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Abstract

Investment in the regeneration of social housing estates has typically been made almost entirely by the public sector. However, in the past decade governments across the European Union, including Ireland, have used a number of different mechanisms to encourage private sector investment in projects of this type. This report examines recent attempts by the Irish government to attract private sector investment to help regenerate disadvantaged social rented estates in Dublin. First, it explores the development of social housing estates using the Public Private Partnership model, through an examination of the regeneration of Fatima Mansions in the inner city. Second, it examines the use of Integrated Area Plans in the suburban districts of Clondalkin and Tallaght which used tax incentives to attract private investment. It concludes that the use of these mechanisms has yielded significant benefits in these cases. However, it doubts on their generalisability to other estates and housing market contexts; thus it emphasises the need for the availability of continued public funding for social housing estate regeneration.

Key words: Private sector investment; disadvantaged areas; public private partnerships; integrated area plans

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The period since 1970 is characterised by two significant waves of reform of arrangements for social housing provision which have swept most western European countries. During the 1970s and 1980s state subsidies for social house building were cut and in several countries sitting tenants gained the right to buy their dwellings. Consequently social housing sectors generally contracted and focused increasingly on housing low-income households rather than a range of income groups (Scanlon and Whitehead, 2007). This development was driven by a number of factors. Some of these, such as funding problems associated with economic recession and the election of governments that were ideologically antipathetic to direct state intervention in the housing system, were external to the tenure. Others were internal. Dunleavy (1981) summarises the latter processes as the 'delegitimation' of the social rented sector.

As researchers began to focus on the problems in social rented communities, social housing managers reported growing management and letting problems and disillusionment grew with the quality of the high-rise dwellings that were common in this tenure. This was increasingly redefined as the cause of poor housing conditions, rather than the solution to them. As a result, by the mid-1980s government spending on the social housing sector was increasingly directed towards the regeneration of existing social housing estates rather than the construction of new ones (Power, 1997). Interventions of this type initially focused on addressing poor building, design and maintenance standards, but in recent years have emphasised the socio-economic regeneration and community development of target estates (Van Kempen *et al*, eds, 2005).

In the Irish context the establishment of the Remedial Works Scheme by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (DoEHLG) in 1985, in tandem with severe cut-backs in funding for new social house building, signalled the start of this policy redirection (Norris, 2001). This scheme provides direct

government funding for the refurbishment of dwellings rented from local authorities which provide some 80 per cent of social housing in Ireland. Since then the DoEHLG has introduced a number of other schemes to directly subsidise the refurbishment aspects of social housing estate regeneration projects, while the social, community and economic aspects of some of these projects have secured grant aid from central government community, youth and local development programmes (Treadwell Shine and Norris, 2006).

In more recent years, however, both central government and the local authorities have placed increased emphasis on involving the private sector in funding and implementing estate regeneration projects. Thus, the Urban Renewal Act 1998 extended the capital tax incentives available for private property development to include local authority estates for the first time (Department of the Environment, 1997). Local authority estates in the operational areas of Dublin and Galway City Councils and Fingal and South Dublin County Councils were designated under this Act which enables the construction or refurbishment costs of commercial premises or dwellings for owner-occupation or rent to be off-set against income or corporation tax. Notably in the case of South Dublin County Council additional 'planning gain' measures were also applied to the estates in question in order to maximise the private sector's contribution to their regeneration. The Council levied an additional charge on developers who secured planning permission to develop tax designated sites in this area and used this money to establish a 'community link fund' which provides grant aid for community projects.

More recently Dublin City Council has employed Public Private Partnership (PPP) arrangements to regenerate the Fatima Mansions estate in the south-west inner city, and announced plans to apply similar arrangements elsewhere, as have other local authorities. PPPs are partnerships between the public and private sector 'for the purposes of designing, planning, financing, constructing and/or operation infrastructure projects normally provided through traditional procurement mechanism by the State' (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2003:4).

This increased focus on involving the private sector also reflects international trends

and national policy developments. In Germany and Austria the private sector has long played a central role in the delivery of social housing, but Scanlon and Whitehead's (2007) review indicates that private sector involvement in social housing delivery and regeneration is growing across most of Western Europe. Social housing providers in the Netherlands and Scandinavia are increasingly reliant on private sector funding, while social housing estate regeneration policy in England requires that between 20 and 50 per cent of the housing on target estates is provided by the private sector.

In the Irish context, the use of Public Private Partnerships for infrastructural procurement was first approved by the government in 1998, PPP units were established in most government departments in 1999 and legislation on PPPs was introduced in 2002 (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2003). The DoEHLG set up a PPP development fund for local authorities in 1999, but housing and urban renewal were first identified as a priority area for PPP development in a 2003 circular from this Department and more recently its 2005 policy statement *Housing Policy Framework: Building Sustainable Communities* notes the following: 'Based on experience to date public private partnerships can play an important role in regenerating areas, and we will encourage this approach where appropriate' (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2003:4).

1.2 Literature Review

Analysis of the aforementioned and other relevant policy statements (Farrell, Grant Sparks *et al*, 1998; Government of Ireland, 2000) reveals that the Irish government has proffered the following rationale for employing PPPs in social housing estate regeneration projects:

- the risks associated with the project can be shared and allocated to the partner best able to manage them
- this model of procurement makes optimum use of private sector management, financial and technical skills and expertise

- consequently this enables public sector officials to focus on service planning rather than carrying out this task in tandem with service delivery
- PPPs also have the potential to elicit a private sector contribution towards the costs of project implementation, thereby reducing the costs to the public sector
- the private sector partners are paid according to performance, thereby maximising their incentive to perform effectively, deliver value for money and reduce implementation costs
- in the context of social housing estate regeneration this model is particularly appropriate for the delivery of mixed tenure estates, which include both social and private housing. The provision of social housing in mixed estates, as far as possible, is a key objective of DoEHLG policy on the sector.

The benefits associated with private sector financial contributions and tenure mixing are also relevant to other methods of enabling this sector to participate in regeneration projects such as the provision of private sector accommodation and developmental levies under the 1998 Urban Renewal Act (Department of the Environment and Local Government, 1997).

The international literature on this issue indicates that in most western European countries finance, or the lack thereof, is the key impetus behind the drive for increasing private sector involvement in the social housing sector. As public funding has been cut back, social landlords have been forced to look for other sources of finance for regeneration projects (Scanlon and Whitehead, 2007). In recent years there has also been a growing appreciation among policy-makers and practitioners working in the regeneration field that the problems of target areas are complex and demand a multi-sectoral response, which should include a role for the private sector (Coulson, 2005). Furthermore, multi-agency partnerships are also envisaged as potentially synergistic, i.e. the partners create more together than they can separately. This is because they involve the pooling of resources and help to avoid duplication. Furthermore, the negotiation and co-operation involved can encourage public-sector partners to adopt a more business-like approach, while private sector partners may become more socially minded (Ball *et al*, 2003).

In housing policy and management practice in many developed countries, the

increasing emphasis on diversifying the tenure of social housing estates, by introducing private housing, has also facilitated more private sector involvement in regeneration projects (Van Kempen *et al*, eds, 2005). This fashion for tenure diversification is in turn related to the growing – though still highly contested – body of evidence which suggests that the spatial concentrations of low-income households associated with large social estates generate ‘neighbourhood effects’, i.e. problems additional to those associated with poverty as such (Arthurson, 2002). Some of the problems of this type, identified in the literature, are economic. For instance, commercial services cannot be established or maintained in areas where average household incomes are low, and this impedes residents’ access to services and employment. Others are social issues, e.g. additional strain on social and community services and stigma associated with low-income areas. Some more relate to community structures – lack of successful, working families to act as community role models and a tendency to be inward looking, as neighbours rely on one another for mutual support, and therefore may lack the wider social networks necessary to access employment and other opportunities (Klienhaus, 2004).

1.3 Project Rationale, Focus, Aims and Objectives

Despite the increasing interest among policy-makers in involving the private sector in estate regeneration in Ireland, this policy development has been the subject of little research to date (Drudy and Punch, 2005 is a notable exception). Such oversight reflects the traditional orientation of research on the impact of public policy on poverty, and on poor neighbourhoods more generally in this country, which has been concerned with the impact of publicly provided social and community services or with the provision of these services by the non-profit sector with the aid of public subsidies.

This research is intended to address this omission by conducting a preliminary review of the key mechanisms employed to enable the private sector participate in social housing estate regeneration projects. Its objective is to examine the potential role that private sector agencies could play in regeneration, the benefits and drawbacks of involving agencies of this type and the effective implementation of regeneration schemes that include the private sector.

1.4 Methodology

This research was operationalised by means of three case studies of the regeneration projects in which the private sector has participated:

- Fatima Mansions (Dublin City Council operational area) – a public private partnership scheme in which a private developer has developed private housing in a site formerly occupied by local authority flats in return for constructing social and affordable housing and community facilities on the remainder of the site and funding a social regeneration plan (Whyte, 2005).
- West Tallaght (South Dublin County Council operational area) – a local authority housing estate which has been designated under the 1998 urban renewal scheme. Consequently, tax incentives were introduced to encourage private sector investment in private housing and commercial facilities; an additional charge was levied on developers who secured planning permission in this area and this was used to finance a ‘community link fund’ which provides grant aid for community projects.
- North Clondalkin (also in South Dublin County Council’s operational area) – a local authority housing estate which was also designated under the 1998 Urban Renewal Scheme and where a community link fund was also established but where the amount of private investment attracted was far less than in Tallaght. Thus the contrasting experiences of these areas are of interest.

These cases were chosen in order to represent the full range of projects in which the private sector has participated to date and to include projects in different locations, both inner-city and suburban. All case study estates are in Dublin City or County, because no relevant regeneration projects have been established to date outside of the Capital. However, it is important to recognise that, apart from the issue of private sector participation, many key characteristics of these projects differ. The Fatima Mansions estate was demolished and rebuilt as part of the regeneration project under review here, for instance, whereas the estates under examination in Tallaght and Clondalkin were subject to less comprehensive improvement. Thus there are

obvious limits to the comparability of these cases.

Three research methods were employed to implement these case studies. Firstly, a review of the existing Irish and international literature on social housing estate regeneration, with particular reference to the role of the private sector in this regard, was conducted. This review also included relevant policy documents, memoranda and legislation.

Secondly a review of relevant primary documentary sources was carried out for each project (see Table 1). In the case of the Tallaght and Clondalkin case studies the Integrated Area Plans (IAP) for each area, which are the planning mechanism used to implement the 1998 Urban Renewal Act, were very comprehensive and provided a baseline against which to compare outcomes. A monitoring committee was established to track progress on the implementation of each IAP and the annual monitoring reports produced by this committee provided information on the progress in the development of the designated sites and the community linkage funds. However, these did not provide sufficient detail for the purposes of this project, so extra information was gleaned from additional unpublished documentation provided by both committees. In the case of Fatima Mansions information on the bids submitted by private sector applicants for the PPP contract was gleaned from an appraisal of these bids and information on the social regeneration for the estate came from the relevant plan (Whyte, 2005).

Finally, 21 in-depth, face-to-face interviews were conducted with key actors involved in the three case studies (see Table 2). All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed in order to provide a *verbatim* record of the conversation and, at the request of interviewees, were anonymised. In Clondalkin and Tallaght these interviews focused on members of the IAP monitoring committees, some of whom were involved in both projects. The specific interviewees were chosen to ensure input from the respective County Councils and the community, trade union and local business representatives and, because the committee membership had changed considerably over the course of IAP implementation, to include individuals who had been involved at different stages.

The key purpose of the interviews was to examine the efficacy of the IAP as a mechanism for regenerating social housing estates, rather than the more established parts of the areas targeted by these mechanisms. As the implementation of the Clondalkin project proved much more problematic than Tallaght, these interviews focused on the latter, more complex and therefore more valuable case study. In Fatima Mansions a sample of key stakeholders in the regeneration project was interviewed. The interviewees included local and central government officials, representatives of the non-profit and community sectors and private consultants who had been involved in its

Table 1 Main Primary Documentary Sources Employed in the Research

| Case | Source | Contents |
|------------------------|---|--|
| Clondalkin | Clondalkin Integrated Area Plan 1998 | Very comprehensive plan, details the socio economic background; financial and other mechanisms for investment and briefs for the designated sites. |
| | Annual Monitoring Reports on the Implementation of the Clondalkin IAP | Reports on progress on individual sites; the community linkage fund and the sale of council owned sites. |
| | Unpublished documents of the monitoring committees for Clondalkin IAP | Including agendas and minutes of meetings; progress reports and other miscellaneous material; community linkage fund guidelines. |
| Fatima Mansions | Appraisal of the private sector bids to regenerate the estate. | Summary of the details and marking of the bids received from private developers. Not detailed and cannot be quoted for commercial sensitivity reasons. |
| | 8 Great Expectations – Fatima Mansions Social Regeneration Plan | Very detailed plan for the social regeneration of the estate produced by Fatima Regeneration Board |
| | Data on spending provided by the DOEHLG and Fatima Regeneration Board | Unpublished data on capital and revenue expenditure on the regeneration of the estate. |
| Tallaght | Tallaght Integrated Area Plan 1998 | Very comprehensive plan, details the socio economic background; the financial and other mechanisms for investment and briefs for the designated sites. |
| | Annual Monitoring Reports on the Implementation of the Tallaght IAP | Reports on progress on individual sites; the community linkage fund and the sale of council owned sites. |
| | Unpublished documents of the monitoring committees for Tallaght IAP | Including agendas and minutes of meetings; progress reports and other miscellaneous material; community linkage fund guidelines. |

Table 2 Key Actor Interviews Undertaken for this Research

| Category of Interviewee | Case | | |
|-----------------------------|------------|----------|-----------------|
| | Clondalkin | Tallaght | Fatima Mansions |
| Central Government | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Local Authority | 1 | | 4 |
| Community/ residents | 2 | | 4 |
| | 3 | 0 | |
| Private sector | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Trade Union | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Non Profit Sector | 1 | 0 | 2 |

design were interviewed. However, none of the property developers involved in either project would agree to be interviewed which raises obvious problems with the comprehensiveness of the sample of interviewees.

1.5 Outline of Report

In addition to this introduction, the report is organised into three sections. The next section examines the use of a PPP to regenerate Fatima Mansions. It opens with an outline of the background to the project, which is followed by analysis of the effectiveness of the design and implementation of this project and the advantages and disadvantages of this model in the specific context of the estate. The closing part of this section then considers the generalisability of this model to other contexts. In Section 3 an analysis of the operation and impacts of the Clondalkin and Tallaght IAPs is presented, together with an assessment of the efficacy of this model as a method of regenerating social housing estates and its usefulness in other contexts. Finally, the conclusions to the report draw out the key findings of this analysis and the issues arising for social housing estate regeneration policy and practice in Ireland.

2 Public Private Partnerships: Fatima Mansions

2.1 Background

Fatima Mansions is located in Dublin's south-west inner-city and was constructed between 1949 and 1951 by Dublin City Council. It was built as a low-rise (four-storey) flats complex, consisting originally of 15 blocks of mainly two-bedroom flats, and is surrounded by a mix of private and social housing. The available evidence (Corcoran, 1998; Community Action Network, 1997) indicates that the estate was for many years settled and in demand among prospective tenants, but it began to go into decline from the 1970s. By the 1980s severe social and housing management problems had developed there which were manifested in hard drug use and dealing, criminality and vandalism, and the decline of the built environment. This change was related to a variety of factors, including: economic decline at local and national levels; the removal of estate-level services provided by the Council; the exclusion of flats from the scheme of sales of dwellings to tenants, which encouraged aspirant home owners to transfer to housing estates; and the growth in hard drug use in the inner city during this time, especially prevalent in Fatima Mansions.

Following a campaign by residents the estate was the subject of a large-scale refurbishment funded by the Remedial Works Scheme in the late 1980s. This involved the installation of new windows, baths, kitchens and floors in individual flats, exterior landscaping, closing of some of the multiple entrances into the estate and the demolition of one block, thereby reducing the number of dwellings in the estate to 320. Research conducted at this time (Norris, 1999:117) concluded that the refurbishment achieved few long-term positive results:

Residents now widely assert that the refurbishment was a complete failure and a waste of money. [Dublin City Council] officials tacitly agree. Some residents concede that it did improve certain physical aspects of the flats, but it did nothing to halt the decay of the estate or improve other aspects of the quality of life. Within a few years some of the blocks had a more derelict appearance than they had before the refurbishment.

The Norris (1999) research concluded that the failure to consult residents on the

design of the refurbishment and to maintain the estate adequately afterwards contributed to these poor outcomes. However, more fundamentally, such outcomes were caused by the failure to match the focus of the interventions, which related solely to the built environment, to the key problems of the area, which were primarily social in nature.

The decade following saw the establishment of a number of community groups on the estate involved in the provision of services for young people, the unemployed and drug users. In 1995 these community groups formed an umbrella group called Fatima Groups United (FGU). Also at this time the independently chaired Fatima Task Force, comprising representatives of FGU, the local authority, other relevant statutory agencies and the non-profit sector, was established and tasked with devising plans to address the effects of social exclusion and marginalisation in the estate.

Following the end of inconclusive negotiations with the City Council regarding the regeneration of the estate, in 2000 FGU established a team consisting of representatives of the residents and the community groups active in the area to examine this issue. The process resulted in the publication of *Eleven Acres, Ten Steps* – ‘a brief from the People of Fatima to the planners, developers and service providers who will help shape the renewal of Fatima’ (Fatima Groups United, 2000:4). The document emphasised that the estate required a holistic regeneration programme which would tackle the social, economic and physical problems of the area; residents must be afforded a central role in the design and implementation of this programme; and the process must be managed by an independent regeneration board made up of representatives of the key relevant statutory and non-profit agencies and the residents.

A community activist interviewed for this research claimed that Dublin City Council was ‘a bit taken aback with the quality, the size, the ambition’ of this document and ‘wanted time to respond’. Six months later the response came in the form of a draft master plan for the regeneration of the estate, entitled *Regeneration/Next Generation* (Dublin City Council, 2002). Although this plan included many of the ideas proposed in FGU’s regeneration brief, such as the regeneration board and the

provision of community facilities in the estate, there were differences between both documents. Most crucially, the Dublin City Council plan placed more emphasis on built-environment related interventions than did the FGU's brief.

Thus further negotiations between the Council and the community were undertaken in 2001, involving very extensive consultation with residents, which resulted in the formulation of a revised master plan for the regeneration of the estate. This plan provided for the demolition of the estate, its replacement by a mix of private, affordable and social housing and commercial and community facilities, and the implementation of a social regeneration plan. It also provided for the dissolution of the Fatima Task Force and its replacement with the Fatima Regeneration Board which would oversee the implementation of the social regeneration plans and would be consulted regarding the plans for renewal of the built environment. This board was established in mid-2001 and incorporated as a legal entity in 2005.

2.2 Project Design and Development

Throughout 2002 Dublin City Council and the DoEHLG explored options for the implementation of the revised master plan for the regeneration of Fatima Mansions. By early 2003 the Council began to explore the option of using a PPP to implement the plan rather than the traditional model whereby it would directly procure the construction work from the market and employ direct public funding, principally from central government, to meet the associated costs. A senior Council official explained that the initiative in this regard came from the local authority rather than central government. According to this source the Council's interest in this option was driven by the following considerations:

New PPP guidelines were introduced by the Department of the Environment which suggested that every programme over one million should at least consider [employing a]... PPP. I don't think anybody ever contemplated that PPP would be used for the regeneration of social housing because it had never been used before... But we were getting worried [about the prospects for raising direct public funding for the project] because it came at the time when there was a little glitch in the economy, I think it was around the time of 9/11... We had a look at the PPP option and we realised that we had a very valuable piece of property... and we certainly had the view that the traditional route was not going to deliver the type of things we wanted; we wanted to [provide] community... facilities and with social housing [regeneration]

projects] you get the money for the social housing only.

A community activist from the estate explained that the Fatima Regeneration Board researched this option in detail, particularly the use of PPPs in the United Kingdom where they have been widely used in the delivery of public projects, before deciding that if this approach delivered the 'master plan and more, we were prepared to participate within the PPP structure'. Their support in this regard was subject to the proviso, subsequently agreed to by Dublin City Council, that the social housing in the estate would remain within the ownership of the Council. Thus, in PPP parlance, the Fatima Mansions regeneration was a Design Build and Finance, rather than a Design, Build, Finance and Operate, project.

In 2003, following advice from the National Treasury Management Agency – a statutory body which provides advice on major public investment projects – tenants moved out from sections of the estate to enable its demolition and tenders were invited for the PPP. Five suitable bids were received and a preferred bidder was announced. Negotiations then took place between Dublin City Council and the preferred bidder, with input from the Fatima Regeneration Board, and the following regeneration programme was agreed:

- the demolishing of the existing social rented units on the estate and their replacement by 150 social rented dwellings
- 70 affordable dwellings for sale at below market value to low-income households
- 396 private apartments for sale on the open market
- a neighbourhood centre to accommodate community services and recreational facilities
- an outdoor all-weather pitch
- a leisure centre to include a 20m swimming pool, gym, aerobic studio and other facilities
- retail and enterprise units.

All of the estate, with the exception of the private dwellings and retail units would remain in the ownership of the Council after the completion of the regeneration process; the remainder would be owned by the developer and sold on the open

market. In addition the developer would pay €6.5 million towards the cost of a social regeneration plan to be implemented by Fatima Regeneration Board. The key points of this plan are summarised in Table 3.

At the time when this research was conducted, the residential units in the estate had been completed and the commercial and leisure facilities partially completed. In addition, the implementation of the social regeneration plan was approximately 50 per cent complete.

2.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the PPP Regeneration Model

This research reveals four significant benefits associated with the PPP model to regenerate Fatima Mansions. These relate to procurement, tenure mixing, risk transfer and finance. However, some potential dis-benefits are also inherent in this model. As explained in Section 2.5 below, these dis-benefits raise questions about the generalisability of this model to other social housing regeneration projects.

Table 3 Key Points of the Fatima Mansions Social Regeneration Plan

| Themes | Actions |
|--|---|
| Creating a Safe & Sustainable Community | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Develop a collaborative approach to community policing ▪ Develop a collective approach to tackling anti-community behaviour ▪ Develop community-based approaches to supporting vulnerable families ▪ Implement a range of preventive measures to sustain the whole community ▪ Implement new and innovative measures |
| Education | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establish a task force to tackle educational disadvantage ▪ Appoint a director of education ▪ Improve access to community pre-school and after-school services ▪ Secure the further development of the Fatima homework club ▪ Support the transition of the Fatima Arklink project to community ownership and management. ▪ Facilitate the development of a state-of-the-art digital media facility and appoint a full-time co-ordinator to this project |
| Health & Wellbeing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Develop and consolidate Fatima Health and Wellbeing Centre ▪ Appoint a project leader to develop a health and wellbeing centre for the Rialto area ▪ Develop a community health forum ▪ Appoint a resource/social worker to support vulnerable families |
| Enterprise Training & Employment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Implement the local labour agreement for the physical regeneration of the estate ▪ Implement training initiatives and pre-apprenticeship courses ▪ Develop community enterprise ▪ Appoint a community enterprise development manager ▪ Develop the Fatima launderette |
| Arts & Culture | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provide public art ▪ Provide arts specific spaces and facilities in the neighbourhood centre ▪ Provide funding for a five-year arts and cultural programme ▪ Provide affordable social housing to artists and key workers ▪ Appoint an arts development co-ordinator |
| Sports & Recreation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Formulate a sport and recreation strategy ▪ Appoint a sports development officer |
| Environment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Undertake remedial works to improve existing environment during the construction phase ▪ Develop waste management programmes ▪ Provide tenant Information Sessions |
| Planning and Design of Community Facilities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establish an appropriate management structure for the neighbourhood centre ▪ Develop an agreed operational policy ▪ Develop an agreed programming policy ▪ Furnish initial budget for the neighbourhood centre |
| Cross-cutting | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensure best practice through monitoring, research and evaluation |

Source: Whyte (2005)

2.3.1 Procurement

Among the individuals interviewed for this project, the Dublin City Council officials raised the issue of procurement benefits associated with the PPP model most often. They argued that, because it employs a single contract, the PPP model is particularly suited to the procurement of this complex scheme, which incorporates a mix of housing tenures and land uses. One Council official explained that in order to achieve the same outcome using the traditional direct procurement model, 'we might have had maybe five phases, maybe five developers, a stop/start approach' and would have had to transfer land to a private developer to facilitate the construction of private housing, thereby losing direct control of this part of the site. In addition, single contract procurement via PPPs can ensure coherent design of complex developments which would be difficult to achieve by using multiple contracts. According to the relevant DoEHLG guidelines, coherent design is an important consideration in good estate design practice (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2007).

A disadvantage of this method of procurement is that it requires detailed preparations prior to tendering and complex negotiations with the preferred bidder to ensure that all aspects of the project are agreed in advance to the satisfaction of all parties. This slows project commencement and requires significant investment in terms of time and money on the part of the commissioning local authority before the project begins. The key actors in the Fatima Mansions project were adamant that, once the project commenced, its implementation proceeded more quickly as a result of this groundwork. Moreover, as mentioned above, in this case much of the groundwork was completed before the PPP model was considered, during the many years of planning and negotiation of various regeneration plans for the estate.

2.3.2 Tenure Mixing

The centrality of tenure and use mixing in the rationale for employing a PPP to regenerate Fatima Mansions also raises the issue of whether this strategy was necessary for the effective regeneration of the estate.

All of the key actors in the Fatima regeneration project who were interviewed for this research agreed that tenure mixing was necessary in the Fatima Mansions estate. The relevant Council project manager explained that its policy is to achieve tenure mixing in all regeneration projects if possible, on the grounds that 'In the past we have found that large-scale developments... were too big to manage', and this view was echoed by interviewees from local community groups and the DoEHLG. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the relevant research literature identifies a range of economic, social and community problems associated with the concentrations of disadvantage associated with large social housing estates, and introducing higher income residents via tenure mixing is commonly used to overcome these problems.

However, there is also evidence to the contrary. For instance, not all of the problems associated with neighbourhood effects are relevant to the case of Fatima Mansions. The average incomes of Fatima Mansions residents are low, but the estate is located in a mixed income neighbourhood and a wide range of commercial services is available locally (Fahey, ed, 1999). Furthermore, tenure mixing by introducing private housing does not necessarily affect income mixing. Kintrea and Muir's (2008) research on Ballymun in north Dublin found that the vast majority of the private housing built as part of its regeneration programme was sold to investors rather than owner occupiers. In many cases these dwellings were let to rent supplement claimants, who generally have low incomes because they must be benefit-dependent in order to qualify for this support.

In addition, although all of the households resident in Fatima Mansions at the time of the regeneration secured housing in the rebuilt estate, the population fell from 220 to 150 households in the years preceding the project commencement because of the Council's policy of not reletting vacant dwellings on the estate in order to free-up dwellings for demolition. The loss of social housing units generated by tenure mixing of regenerated social estates is particularly problematic in the Dublin context,

because housing need in this city is relatively high. In 2005 Dublin City Council accounted for 12.9 per cent of all households on the waiting list for social housing nationally (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, various years).

On balance, however, the evidence compiled for this research indicates that tenure mixing and a reduction in the size of the social renting population was necessary for the effective regeneration of Fatima Mansions because the extent of stigma, disadvantage and social problems in this estate was particularly acute. Thus when asked about the implications of the fall in the estate population prior to the regeneration, a longstanding community activist in Fatima Mansions argued:

some of the families that were in those 70 [suffered severe social problems].... the projects here and all the services could make it a credible impact on the quality of the [remaining] families' lives now and the jobs and opportunities, self esteem, confidence. I honestly believe had it been 220 [resident households] we'd have been struggling [to achieve that]...

This view was echoed by a non-profit sector service provider, based in the estate, who argued that in terms of the number of social housing units in the estate 'the largest size wasn't necessarily the most sustainable size'.

2.3.3 Risk Sharing

As mentioned above, central government policy statements also identify risk sharing between the public and private sectors as a key advantage of PPPs, and there is evidence that the developer shouldered considerable risk in the Fatima Mansions project. A Dublin City Council official argued that the developer 'was taking a big risk coming to an area that had been previously disadvantaged over a period of 20 years... to build private apartments that he'd have to sell'. A senior DoEHLG official pointed out that the developer's risk was maximised by the contractual stipulation that the social housing be completed before the private units in this estate. This means that the 'developer has to get the public bit right to the... local authority's satisfaction before they can do their own', and also maximises the developer's market risk because the developer negotiated a contract on the basis of assumptions regarding the market value of the private housing in 2003, but completed these

dwellings four years later, by which time market conditions may have changed significantly. Although the developer of Fatima Mansions was not available to be interviewed for this project, the very substantial reduction on house prices in Ireland since late 2006 indicates that the market value of the private dwellings in the estate may no longer be as high as would have been assumed when the terms of the project were negotiated.

On the other hand the public sector bears significant risks prior to the commencement of the project. The costs associated with devising the master plan for the regeneration of the estate, consulting with residents on its content and providing alternative accommodation for them in order to enable demolition of the dwellings were substantial in Fatima Mansions. Interviewees estimated that the third of these tasks alone cost in the region of €1 million. Inherent in the PPP model is the risk that this public sector investment may come to nothing if no private sector agency is willing to bid for the project, or if negotiations with the preferred bidder fail to produce an agreement. Although these risks did not materialise in the Fatima Mansions project, in mid-2008 negotiations with the preferred bidder for PPP contracts to regenerate five other social estates in Dublin collapsed. As is discussed in Section 2.4 below this development raises doubts regarding the generalisability of this estate regeneration model to other contexts.

2.3.4 Finance

Apart from the publicly funded preparation costs, the Fatima Mansions regeneration was almost entirely financed by the transfer of part of the site to the developer, who covered the costs of building the social and affordable housing, the community facilities and the implementation of the social regeneration plan, in return for ownership of the private housing and commercial units. For reasons of commercial sensitivity, the evidence regarding the selection of the PPP model for this project or of the preferred bidder in the tendering process was not available to the authors. Thus it is not possible for this research to make a judgement regarding the value for money of this regeneration strategy, compared to other funding options such as sale of a section of the site or direct public funding, or indeed the value for money provided by unsuccessful PPP bids compared to the one selected.

It is worth noting that, as per the standard requirements for projects of this type, the National Treasury Management Agency assessed its terms and concluded that it did constitute value for money for the exchequer. However, in view of the cost and significance of PPP regeneration projects, in terms of their impact on disadvantaged communities, the methodology employed to assess their value for money certainly merits further, detailed research.

On balance, this research does highlight a number of important advantages associated with the funding model employed in Fatima. For instance, the potential public expenditure savings generated are particularly advantageous for government in view of the fact that to date the vast majority of estate regeneration projects undertaken in Ireland have been almost entirely publicly financed. An interviewee from Dublin City Council made the point that using PPPs for estate regeneration creates the potential to 'release funding for providing new affordable housing or social housing'. There was also a consensus among interviewees that the PPP mechanism generated greater funding for the Fatima Mansions project than that available from mainstream public sources. In this vein, a senior DoEHLG official suggested that 'a lot more money went into the project than the state would ever have provided', and a Council official pointed out that the size and fit-out of the social rented units in the regenerated estate were more generous than those specified in the rules regarding publicly funded dwellings.

From the perspective of the community and non-profit sector interests interviewed, the funding of the social regeneration plan was identified as a key achievement of the PPP, not only because of the level of investment generated but also because of the flexibility of arrangements for its use, compared to alternative sources. As mentioned above, the plan provides for a comprehensive and integrated response to the socio-economic problems of this community, and interviewees argued convincingly that it would have been very difficult to establish this programme without the private sector contribution. This is because the exchequer funding for estate regeneration is limited largely to capital spending; the available revenue funding is small and is distributed via a large number of mainly time-limited funding streams which are challenging to access and necessitate a stop/start approach to project implementation (see Treadwell Shine and Norris (2006) for a fuller discussion of this

issue). Moreover, a key objective of the social regeneration plan was to fund innovative interventions not eligible for government finance. Therefore it is likely that much of the plan would not have secured public funding in any case.

2.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of Project Implementation

The evidence collected for this research indicates that the implementation of the Fatima Mansions regeneration project was smooth and efficient. The reasons for this relate to: the context for its implementation; arrangements for the management of this process; and the skills and experience of the key actors involved. However, as discussed in Section 2.5 below, many of the reasons for the effective implementation of this project relate to the particular history of community development and regeneration in Fatima Mansions; smooth implementation of PPP regeneration projects may be more difficult to achieve in other social housing estates.

2.4.1 Economic and Housing Market Context

In relation to the first of these issues there is no doubt that the wider economic and housing market context in 2004, when the Fatima Mansions PPP was negotiated, eased its implementation significantly. The Irish economy had been growing at unprecedented rates since the mid-1990s, as had house prices and housing output. In addition the long-term decline of the population of inner-city Dublin had been arrested by this time and the average incomes of households in that area grew, as did land values (Norris and Shiels, 2007; Pratschke and Haase, 2007). Consequently, from the viewpoint of prospective private sector partners, investment in Fatima Mansions was a much more attractive prospect than it would have been a decade previously. Thus the PPP competition attracted a reasonable number of bids and the self-financing model described above was possible.

2.4.2 Skills and Experience of Key Actors

The particular history of estate regeneration and community development initiatives in Fatima Mansions and the skills and experience of the residents' representatives and the community organisations in the estate were also key factors in the successful implementation of the PPP. As mentioned above, a number of regeneration plans for the estate were devised during the late 1990s by the local

authority and the community sector and these were formulated into a joint plan in 2001. The existence of this plan considerably speeded the implementation of the PPP once this option was decided upon, since it formed the basis of the tender documents. In addition, the negotiation process improved the working relationship and trust between both parties, facilitated skills acquisition and learning and ultimately enabled the production and implementation of a more comprehensive and sophisticated regeneration plan than would have been the case otherwise.

Trust between the local authority and the community partners was vital for implementation of the PPP, since the latter were not included in contractual arrangements for its implementation – this was done via a two-way contract between the developer and the local authority. A senior Council official also acknowledged that in Fatima Mansions there is ‘a sophisticated community’ and that negotiating with them ‘has made us much more sophisticated as well... we were dragged roaring and screaming, but we have learned an awful lot from it’. In addition, since the late 1990s sophisticated structures for community representation have been established in Fatima Mansions, and the capacity and skills of the organisations and individuals involved are very well developed. A representative of this sector argued convincingly that these arrangements enabled it to negotiate the best possible deal for the community from the regeneration process:

... if you don't organise locally, get your structures right and get your capacity right it doesn't matter a damn what Dublin City Council or the developer does because you won't be able to take them on, you won't be able to compete with them on some sort of level playing field... unless you have an organised body of residents and activists and voluntary groups.

These skills were obviously necessary to enable the community sector implement the ambitious and multi-faceted social regeneration for the estate, via the Fatima Regeneration Board.

2.4.3 Project Management

Aspects of the management of the implementation of Fatima Mansions project were also cited by interviewees as contributors to its success. A senior Council official argued that the flexible approach adopted to the project design, compared to the

norm in the UK for instance where central government has been very prescriptive regarding the design and implementation of projects of this type, was a key factor in its success (see Kirk and Wall, 2001, for a discussion of this issue in the UK context). The official claimed: 'in a lot of ways we manipulated or we designed a PPP process that suited the particular circumstances and we were very much in control of it and I think that went down well in the community'. Another representative of the same organisation suggested that successful implementation of a project of this type necessitates the establishment of new structures and ways of working in the Council which are less bureaucratic than the traditional norm. In particular he highlighted the key role of the project manager for the estate, the central project management unit in headquarters and the team of experts that has been assembled to advise the Council on PPPs.

A community representative, on the other hand, emphasised the importance of the legal incorporation of the Fatima Regeneration Board, in ensuring that the objectives of this sector were met in the implementation of the PPP. He summarised the significance of these as follows:

... if the Council said they were pulling out of this, it seems much easier politically to walk away from an *ad hoc* arrangement [for consulting the community] than it is to walk away from a company with a director, all the legalities. But because the company had set out its mission and its objectives and its tasks around regeneration...it gives it a weight and authority basically.

2.5 Generalisability of this Regeneration Model to Other Contexts

Although the empirical evidence compiled for this research supports largely positive conclusions about the achievements of the PPP model in the case of the regeneration of Fatima Mansions, it indicates that this model is not generalisable to all contexts. This view is further substantiated by the recent breakdown of negotiations with the preferred bidder for a number of other PPP contracts for the regeneration of other social rented estates in Dublin. This research indicates that the potential to apply this model to other social housing estates is constrained by three factors: the macro-economic context, the characteristics of the target estate and the

capacity of those involved in its design and implementation. Nevertheless, strategies are available which could help to overcome these constraints.

In relation to the first of these issues, as was argued above, strong economic and house price growth during the period when the Fatima Mansions PPP was developed, significantly helped its smooth implementation and maximised the private sector contribution to its costs, thereby minimising costs to government. A private sector advisor on the formulation of this PPP stressed that an increased exchequer financial contribution would enable the model to be applied in the context of weaker economic and housing price growth, although from the perspective of government, the financial benefits generated are obviously less. The advisor noted that PPP projects that attracted a very large private sector contribution could be used to subsidise less 'profitable' projects.

This interviewee and the local and central government representatives consulted for this research were in agreement that the PPP regeneration model is very difficult to apply in the context of a volatile housing market. One stakeholder summarised the reasons for this as follows:

It is very difficult to do a PPP, where you bid at one stage and then a year and a half later [when finalising the negotiations] if the conditions are too different you then have a very, very difficult negotiating position... because one or other party is unhappy. Because either things have gone swimmingly... in which case the builder wants to do it and now the state is beginning to say, 'well did we sell this too cheap?' Or more likely in the current situation... is that developers are looking at it and saying 'oh God I signed up for this in the good times, we now have bad times ... I want to renegotiate...'. So it is a model that could be used elsewhere, yes, but it is subject to market conditions.

The same interviewee suggested that this risk could be minimised by ensuring that negotiations with the preferred bidder could be finalised as quickly as possible by for instance securing planning permission to develop the site in advance of the call for tenders. However, he also acknowledged that this requirement must be balanced with competing pressures, such as ensuring all details of the agreement are legally satisfactory and consulting with the community regarding its content, which slow down the negotiation process.

There was also a consensus among interviewees that the high value of the Fatima Mansions site and the relatively large amount of unused land there, which was available for development, were key to the viability of the self-funding PPP model employed there. Thus there was a view that this model would be more difficult to apply to more densely developed social housing estates. In theory the model could be applied to low land value sites if a greater public subsidy were made available. However, several of the Council officials interviewed raised concerns that the open market private housing and commercial facilities might be difficult or impossible to sell in such areas, that open market housing in these areas might be sold to investors and let to benefit claimants, which would not affect income mixing, and that provision of affordable housing might be a more sensible strategy in such contexts.

Finally, the key contribution which the skills and capacity of the local authority and community partners made to the success of the Fatima Mansions regeneration scheme raises the concern that this model may be difficult to apply successfully in contexts where the capacity of key stakeholders is weaker. However, several interviewees pointed out that this challenge arises in most regeneration schemes (see Treadwell Shine and Norris, 2007), including those funded directly by the exchequer, and there is no reason why it could not be overcome with appropriate training, support and advice.

3 Integrated Area Plans: Clondalkin And Tallaght

3.1 Introduction

The use of tax and other fiscal incentives for urban renewal began in 1986 and was primarily focused on the regeneration of inner urban areas with an emphasis on the construction of office and industrial developments as well as private housing. This first phase of urban renewal was subject to an official review in 1996. The review concluded that while the fiscal incentives had been very successful with regard to generating physical renewal, the achievement of social and community objectives had been less successful (Department of the Environment, 1996). Consequently, when a further phase of urban renewal was envisaged there was a quite conscious attempt to ensure that social and community objectives were afforded a high priority. More radically, however, the Urban Renewal Act of 1998 proposed that, in addition to the designation of inner urban areas, a number of disadvantaged suburban areas would also be designated where tax incentives would apply. Moreover, the new urban renewal scheme targeted specific sites whereas the designations in the original scheme applied to the entirety of a designated area. The rationale for this approach was that in disadvantaged areas a targeted approach was more appropriate than a broad-brush approach.

In that context, South Dublin County Council proposed that two Integrated Area Plans (IAPs) be designated, one in Clondalkin and one in Tallaght, with specified sites identified which could avail of tax incentives. This section of the report describes and analyses the operation and impacts of the Clondalkin and Tallaght IAPs, with the main focus being on the Clondalkin plan, partly because the Tallaght IAP has been the subject of some detailed analysis (MacLaran and Punch, 2004) and partly because in the course of the initial research it became clear that Clondalkin was the more difficult area in which to attract private investment and hence the greater test of the efficacy of fiscal incentives to attract private sector investment.

3.2 Clondalkin Integrated Area Plan

In 1999 South Dublin County Council, in partnership with a number of local development groups, produced an Integrated Area Plan (IAP) for Clondalkin. Participation of local communities was a required element of the formulation of the plan. In Clondalkin and Tallaght this was made somewhat easier as the EU URBAN programme had high levels of participation between the Council and local communities in the disadvantaged areas and the needs identified in URBAN were, in part, adopted into the IAPs.

According to the original Clondalkin Integrated Area Plan, the 'main aim of the IAP is to stimulate development in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods of North and West Clondalkin by improving the physical, environmental, social and economic characteristics of those areas while also encouraging development on certain derelict sites within Clondalkin Village' (South Dublin County Council, 1998a). The specific objectives of the Clondalkin IAP are outlined in Box 1.

| Box 1 | Clondalkin IAP Objectives |
|----------|--|
| | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To continue to upgrade the urban form of the Village Centre area through the use of incentives in order to facilitate and encourage the development of Clondalkin as a vibrant District Centre 2. To upgrade and improve the neighbourhood facilities including through the transferral of funds from the commercially successful Village Centre to the disadvantaged residential neighbourhoods of North and West Clondalkin 3. To improve the economic profile of the population through improved access to training and employment opportunities 4. To provide significant environmental improvements, through good urban design, traffic calming and landscaping 5. To encourage and support partnership arrangements to allow community and non-profit organisations avail of the tax incentives 6. To provide a community facility located centrally in each of the neighbourhoods, which is accessible to all residents and connected by public transport to the other neighbourhoods, Clondalkin Village and places of employment and education 7. To provide a major sporting/leisure facility in the North Clondalkin area 8. To preserve and enhance the Village Core through public and private improvement works as well as traffic calming measures which discourage through traffic |

Source: South Dublin County Council (1998a)

With regard to the disadvantaged areas of North and West Clondalkin, the aims of the IAP were to rejuvenate neighbourhood centres, to improve the environment and to provide sporting and leisure facilities (South Dublin County Council, 1998a:29).

3.2.1 Integrated Area Plan Incentives

There were two main sources of incentives which sought to attract private sector involvement to Clondalkin. The first source was the tax incentives from central government and the second was the incentives obtainable from South Dublin County Council. Each of these is described in turn.

Central Government Tax Incentives

As the Integrated Area Plans were primarily based on the provisions of the Urban Renewal Act 1998, the main mechanism for attracting investment into the designated area were tax incentives for new development. Figure 1 and Table 4 show the legally defined boundary of the Clondalkin IAP as well as the specific sites where tax incentives applied. Clondalkin IAP was, in effect, divided between the commercial centre of Clondalkin Village where the

Table 4 Designated Sites in Clondalkin IAP

| | Category B Sites – disadvantaged areas | |
|-----------|--|------------------|
| 1 | Quarryvale Neighbourhood Centre | North Clondalkin |
| 2 | Rowlagh Neighbourhood Centre | |
| 3 | Neilstown Neighbourhood Centre | |
| 4 | Balgaddy-Stewarts Hospital | |
| 5 | Fonthill Road East Side | |
| 6 | Deansrath Neighbourhood Centre | West Clondalkin |
| 7 | Bawnogue Neighbourhood Centre | |
| | Category A Sites – Clondalkin Village | |
| 8 | Cowans hardware site | |
| 9 | Old Mill site | |
| 10 | Lands between Nangor Road, Ninth Lock Road and New Nangor Road | |
| 11 | Lands north of Cammock river | |
| 12 | Lands South of Fox and Geese Road | |
| 13 | Triangular site south-east of ninth lock | |
| 14 | Civic Offices | |

designated sites are referred to as Category A sites, and the disadvantaged areas of North and West Clondalkin where the designated sites are referred to as Category B sites. In Clondalkin Village seven key commercial sites were designated and commercial and residential tax incentives were applicable. In North and West Clondalkin seven sites were identified, with the three key sites being the neighbourhood centres of Quarryvale, Rowlagh and Neilstown.

As Table 5 shows, different tax incentives applied to the different categories of sites. In the Category A sites in Clondalkin Village these incentives applied to industrial and commercial (office and retail) buildings as well as to rented residential property. The same incentives applied to the Category B sites. South Dublin County Council, at the time when the IAP was being planned, sought that owner-occupied residential allowances be available for any new dwellings built within the boundaries of the IAP but excluding the specified Category A and B sites. However, according to the IAP Project Manager this was refused although the reasons for the refusal were not known. The refusal of this incentive in Clondalkin was seen as a weakness in attracting investment and it meant that only the specific designated sites could avail of incentives. However, this tax relief was allowed in the Tallaght IAP.



Figure 1 Clondalkin Integrated Area Plan Designated Sites

Table 5 Tax Incentives in Clondalkin IAP 1999-2006

| | Tax Incentives which applied |
|--|--|
| Category A sites Clondalkin village | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Industrial and commercial buildings – 100% tax allowance |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Section 23 relief on rented residential property |
| Category B sites Disadvantaged area north and west Clondalkin | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Industrial and commercial buildings – 100% tax allowance |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Section 23 relief on rented residential property |
| Category C area (lands within the IAP boundaries but excluding Category A and B sites). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NONE. Owner-occupied residential allowances were applied for but not given |

Figure 2 Tax Incentives in Clondalkin IAP

One of the core problems of introducing tax relief on property development is to ensure as far as possible that the resulting investment is net additional investment. These problems are referred to as deadweight and displacement. According to the recent review of the tax incentive schemes by Goodbody, 'Dead weight occurs where, in the absence of the incentives scheme, the investor would have invested in the designated area on some scale and at some time' and 'Displacement occurs where, by investing in the area, activity is created which displaces activities from other areas' (Department of Finance, 2006:14).

As Box 2 shows, these issues were analysed by South Dublin County Council at the time of the preparation of the IAP. In essence they conclude that, given the particular socio-economic circumstances of North and West Clondalkin in particular, the tax incentives would not give rise to problems of deadweight or displacement. If the tax incentives were to be successful, the Council argued, they would bring additional and new investment to the area, which would otherwise not have happened. This general argument quite forcefully states: 'As regards Category B sites, private investment in these areas would be considered a high risk even if generous tax incentives were available. The medium to long term sustainability of any development built there would be questionable' (South Dublin County Council, 1998a:39). Thus,

| Box 2 Deadweight and Displacement in Clondalkin IAP | |
|--|--|
| | Clondalkin Category A Sites |
| Deadweight | The Category A business sites have remained in a state of dereliction and have been so for a number of years. They are key sites in the rejuvenation of the Village and it is intended that their development will set a new high standard. Deadweight is not an issue in respect of designation in the Village. |
| Displacement | This issue was of concern in the formulation of this plan – the need to balance development within the Village and develop links to North and West Clondalkin is a core principle of the plan. The sites and proposed uses were selected with this issue primarily in mind. |
| | Category B sites |
| Deadweight | It is not a problem which is likely to be relevant since the Category B sites are extremely unlikely to be improved and/or fully developed without designation and have not done so up to now. |
| Displacement | In the neighbourhood centres the proposals aim to build sustainable integrated centres serving previously uncatered for needs. It is not proposed to merely relocate existing business. There is no question of displacement. |

Source: South Dublin County Council (1998a)

even at the start of the IAP process there was significant doubt expressed as to the potential of incentives in the disadvantaged areas. Moreover, professional property valuers' appraisal of the majority of the Category B sites expressed grave reservations as to their potential even with incentives.

South Dublin County Council Incentives

In addition to the central government tax incentives, local authorities were at liberty to establish their own incentives and mechanisms to further help investment. South Dublin County Council took a pro-active view of this and, as can be seen in Box 3, offered what at the time was an important incentive. Developers who availed of tax incentives on the Category B sites in the disadvantaged areas would not be subject to standard development levies. When combined with the tax incentives it was hoped that this would attract private sector investment on the designated sites.

Box 3 South Dublin County Council Incentives for Clondalkin IAP

Waving of standard planning permission development levies on Category B sites
* in practice some development levies were attached to planning permissions on Category B sites, so that in effect developers paid partial development levies.

3.2.3 Clondalkin IAP Community Gain Mechanisms

As one of the core aims of the Integrated Area Plans was to deliver on identified social and community objectives, South Dublin County Council devised four methods of achieving social and community gain. These are shown in Table 6. The first mechanism, the Community Linkage Fund, was tied to the property tax incentives and in order to succeed needed developers to avail of tax incentives on the designated sites. The Community Linkage Fund was essentially a levy on Category A sites developed in Clondalkin Village. The funds collected from this levy would then be used for community and social purposes within the disadvantaged areas. The second mechanism was that the proceeds from the sale of council-owned sites in the disadvantaged areas would be reinvested in infrastructural works and facilities in these same areas.

Table 6 South Dublin County Council Community Gain Initiatives for Clondalkin IAP

| Community Gain Initiative | Purpose |
|---|---|
| 1. Community Linkage Contribution Fund – a levy from the development of the category A sites in the village | To be spent in the disadvantaged area and for non-capital and non-infrastructure works |
| 2. Proceeds (100 per cent) from sales of council-owned Category B sites | To be invested in the disadvantaged area of North and West Clondalkin in the form of works, facilities and infrastructure |
| 3. Part of the proceeds (15 per cent) from the sale of council-owned Category A sites in Clondalkin Village | To be invested in the disadvantaged area of North and West Clondalkin in the form of works, facilities and infrastructure |
| 4. Receipts from rates from new rateable valuations in the Village Centre sites to be used by the Local Authority for a period of 5 years | For expenditure on improved infrastructure in the socially deprived neighbourhoods both in the designated sites and in the environs |

Source: Interviews and South Dublin County Council (1998a)

The third mechanism was that part of the proceeds (15 per cent) of the sale of council-owned sites in Clondalkin Village, which had designated status, would be reinvested in the disadvantaged areas, again on facilities and infrastructure. The fourth and final mechanism was the rates from the Category A sites would be used to reinvest in North and West Clondalkin.

Community Linkage Fund

One of the most ground-breaking aspects of the Clondalkin IAP was the inclusion of the Community Linkage Contribution, which sought to transfer some of the benefits from the successful Village Centre sites into the disadvantaged areas. The Community Linkage Contribution, which was set at €2.54 per sq. ft. of development (excluding multi-storey or underground car parking), was to be paid into a fund immediately prior to investors/developers receiving their Final Certification (to avail of tax incentives) from South Dublin County Council. From the interviews it was clear that South Dublin County Council had a difficult task persuading Central Government of the merits of this approach but in the end succeeded in obtaining it. This is somewhat surprising as the Council after all was merely taking its cue from the

KPMG review which suggested the Boston Linkage Fund as something worth emulating.

As the Community Linkage Fund was a new source of funding, the monitoring committees of Clondalkin and Tallaght jointly formulated the types of project that could apply for funding as well as the criteria for assessing applications. According to the IAP the 'Community Linkage Fund has been set up to assist the development of projects and programmes to address local community need and enhance the quality of life for people living in IAP designated communities' (South Dublin County Council, 1998a). Box 4 shows the categories of projects for which funding could be sought and Box 5 shows the assessment guidelines used in allocating funds. The Community Linkage Fund was heavily oversubscribed both in Clondalkin and Tallaght as it was a new fund which could give additional funding to an existing project.

Box 4 Purpose of Community Linkage Funds – Clondalkin and Tallaght

Applications are invited for funding under the following categories:

A. Youth and Youth Work

- Targeting those young people who are most disadvantaged
- Developing already existing community resources/premises to ensure their relevance to young people
- Enhancing leadership capacity within the sector

B. Community

- Building civic education/awareness and responsibility
- Supporting, strengthening and building community capacity to manage projects and programmes including the co-ordination of community facilities
- Promoting the integration of non-nationals/migrants
- Developing and resourcing the local economy

C. Community/Personal Safety

- Supporting environmental projects which have as their focus personal and community safety

D. Cross-Cutting Applications

- Developing proposals which address more than one of the above

Source: Unpublished Guidelines, South Dublin County Council.

Box 5 Community Linkage Fund Assessment Guidelines – Clondalkin and Tallaght

Criteria for assessing funding applications

All funding applications will be prioritised under the following six criteria:

- The development of proposals by a number of organisations which include local involvement and collaboration and is particularly inclusive of local stakeholders
- A commitment to targeting those at risk of poverty and disadvantage
- An integrated approach that shows awareness of how the project relates to and is integrated into the development of the area
- A degree of innovation and provides additionality rather than duplicate existing actions/programmes
- A clear strategy, actions, targets and outcomes
- A capacity to produce learning

Source: Unpublished Guidelines, South Dublin County Council.

An evaluation panel made up of one public representative, one council official, one community sector representative and two external independent experts would undertake the assessment of applications and make a recommendation to the Monitoring Committee. The Monitoring Committees subsequently made formal recommendations to the elected members of South Dublin County Council.

3.3 Tallaght Integrated Area Plan

This section describes in summary fashion the Tallaght IAP. The various incentive mechanisms described for Clondalkin also applied in Tallaght, with only minor differences, hence these are not repeated here. However, the context for the Tallaght IAP was different as one of its core aims was to develop the Town Centre into a coherent urban centre based on modern urban design principles. The aim of Tallaght Integrated Area Plan was ‘...to ensure that the Urban Renewal Scheme will address the physical, economic, social and environmental regeneration of Tallaght Town Centre and the disadvantaged West Tallaght neighbourhoods’ (South Dublin County Council, 1998b). Box 6 outlines the specific objectives of Tallaght IAP.

Box 6 Tallaght IAP Objectives

- To provide incentives to encourage an appropriate form of 'Urban Town Centre' which should include a lively mix of uses, in particular a strong residential component
 - To provide incentives to encourage the revitalisation of the Neighbourhood Centres in West Tallaght.
 - To develop a range of infrastructure facilities in both the Town Centre and West Tallaght appropriate to the population they serve
 - To provide 15 per cent social housing in the Town Centre
 - To utilise the opportunities of urban renewal to tackle, in an integrated way, the problems associated with socio-economic exclusion
 - To employ a mechanism of transferring funds from the commercially successful Town Centre to the disadvantaged residential neighbourhood of West Tallaght
 - To encourage and support partnership arrangements to allow community and non-profit organisations avail of the tax incentives
 - To promote and adopt co-operative and participative working arrangements and structures to implement the Integrated Area Plan
- * the social housing objectives were superseded with the advent of Part V of the Planning and Development Act 2000.

Source: South Dublin County Council (1998b)

Under the Tallaght Integrated Area Plan, 23 Category A sites were designated for tax incentives within Tallaght Town Centre, while a further 9 Category B sites were designated within the neighbourhood centres serving the disadvantaged residential areas of Killinarden, Jobstown, Kiltalown, Brookfield and Fettercairn in West Tallaght. Table 7 sets out the Central Government tax incentives available in Tallaght. These are the same as in Clondalkin with the difference that in Tallaght owner-occupied residential allowances were allowed within the boundaries of the IAP.

Table 7 Tax Incentives in Tallaght IAP 1999-2006

| | Tax Incentives which applied |
|--|---|
| Category A sites Tallaght village | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industrial and commercial buildings – 100% tax allowance |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Section 23 relief on rented residential property |
| Category B sites disadvantaged area north and west Tallaght | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industrial and commercial buildings – 100% tax allowance |
| Category C area (lands within the IAP area but excluding Category A and B sites). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Owner-occupied residential allowances allowed within the boundaries of Tallaght IAP |

3.4 IAP Outcomes and Impacts

This section examines the outcomes and impacts of the Integrated Area Plan in Clondalkin and Tallaght. It examines the role of the monitoring committees which tracked progress on each IAP, then summarises overall investment in each area and finally examines the impact of the community gain initiatives used.

3.4.1 Monitoring of IAPS

Central government issued guidelines which recommended the formation of IAP monitoring committees (Department of the Environment and Local Government, 1999). It was suggested that such committees consist of a maximum of nine members comprising:

- three representatives of the local authority or authorised company and relevant urban district council or borough council, one of whom must be the senior official responsible for the implementation of the IAP. One of the representatives should be appointed as Chairperson of the Monitoring Committee
- one Chamber of Commerce or similar business representative
- one Trade Council or similar representative
- one representative of architectural, historical, conservationist interests
- three community group representatives.

The purpose of the monitoring Committee was to:

- monitor progress in achieving the objectives of the IAP
- establish performance indicators in relation to meeting the objectives of the IAP and against which progress can be measured
- identify and deal with problems or barriers which might arise and which might cause delay in the implementation process
- address any change in circumstances since the preparation of the IAP
- respond to any unforeseen opportunities that might present themselves.

A number of community representatives were interviewed from both Clondalkin and Tallaght IAP monitoring committees and the work of MacLaran *et al* (2007) supplements this as it describes in detail the responses of monitoring committee members of Tallaght IAP. The responses of the community representatives in Clondalkin was, on the whole, quite negative, certainly more negative than the responses of Tallaght community members. One interviewee opined: 'I never really felt that I was participating at all', while another said: 'You always felt that you were going to something where everything had already been decided'. Other interviewees said that the monitoring committees were 'intimidating' for them as they dealt with very complex processes of property development, planning and tax breaks and that it was 'hard to get your head around'.

To some extent these perceptions may have arisen from the nature of the IAP itself in that many of the key decisions had already been made prior to the monitoring committees being formed. For example, the designation of particular sites had been made and, while there was some consultation over which sites were selected, non-local-authority members of the monitoring committee may not have been party to those decisions. In addition, the guidelines for the monitoring committees indicate that the main purpose of the committee was to monitor progress. However, it is clear that community members were quite unhappy with the level of detail supplied on progress, particularly with regard to the provision of financial details on the sale of sites and where the proceeds were subsequently spent. The community linkage fund, by contrast, was transparent in its operation.

3.4.2 Investment in Clondalkin and Tallaght IAPs

According to figures published by South Dublin County Council, as shown in Table 8 and Figure 3, overall investment in new development reached just over €1 billion, with 90 per cent of that being invested in Tallaght and 10 per cent in Clondalkin. With regard to the distribution of investment in Tallaght, just over 90 per cent of all investment was in the Town Centre with just under 10 per cent in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In Clondalkin, by contrast, 80 per cent of the investment was in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods, with 20 per cent being in Clondalkin Village. Thus, as expected, Tallaght received the bulk of the investment and, if we take the example of Tallaght Town Centre, it alone accounted for 83 per cent of the total

investment in the two IAP areas. With regard to investment in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods in both areas, a total of €157 million was invested which accounted for 15 per cent of overall investment.


The period of the IAPs coincided with rapid economic growth and, in particular, extraordinary growth in the property sector. Thus, an obvious, albeit difficult question concerns the issue of deadweight and displacement and the degree to which development in Tallaght Town Centre would have occurred even without tax incentives. The objective of this report is to examine the impact of the IAPs on private sector investment in the disadvantaged areas and not to assess the commercial areas of Tallaght Town Centre and Clondalkin Village. Nonetheless, in the context of economic and property growth it is likely that a high level of development would have occurred in Tallaght even without the tax breaks. However, in the case of Tallaght the high level of development ensured that a

Table 8 Investment in Clondalkin and Tallaght IAP Designated Sites

| | Clondalkin | Tallaght | Totals |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|
| Town Centre | €20,800,000 | €890,131,601 | €910,931,601 |
| Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods | €85,418,000 | €71,950,000 | €157,368,000 |
| Total | €106,218,000 | €962,081,601 | €1,068,299,601 |

Source: South Dublin County Council (2007)

Figure 3 Total Investment in Clondalkin and Tallaght IAP 1999-2007



Source: South Dublin County Council (2007)

significant amount of funding was levied to the Community Linkage Fund. One positive element of the tax incentives was that, as developers required local authority certification before they could claim the tax breaks, it gave the local authority leverage to ensure that developments were completed as agreed and that the community funds were transferred to the Council (Interview, Project Manager).

Table 9 details the quantum of development built over the period of the IAPs. In line with the level of financial investment it shows that the bulk of development was built in Tallaght, particularly in the town centre. Table 10 shows the amount of new housing developed, and again the bulk of new housing was developed in Tallaght.

Table 9 Quantity of Development in Clondalkin and Tallaght IAPs

| | Clondalkin | Tallaght | Totals |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| | M ² | M ² | M ² |
| Town Centre | 4,390 | 423,153 | 427,543 |
| Neighbourhoods | 75,839 | 35,400 | 111,239 |
| Total | 80,229 | 458,652 | 538,881 |

Source: South Dublin County Council (2007)

Table 10 Residential Development in Clondalkin and Tallaght IAPs

| | Clondalkin | Tallaght | Totals |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| | N | N | |
| Town Centre | 186 | 2463 | 2649 |
| Neighbourhoods | 620 | 452 | 1072 |
| Total | 806 | 2915 | 3721 |

Source: South Dublin County Council (2007).

Rowlagh Neighbourhood Centre, Clondalkin

Returning to the original objectives of the Clondalkin IAP, one of the key objectives of these was to regenerate neighbourhood centres in disadvantaged areas. With regard to North Clondalkin, the specific aim was to rejuvenate the three neighbourhood centres of Quarryvale, Neilstown and Rowlagh, which were designated for tax incentives. Over the course of the IAP there was little or no development in Quarryvale. According to the interviews conducted for this research the primary reason for this lack of investment was because of the inability of different shop owners to agree to a vision for regeneration. In Rowlagh, however, one of the shop owners responded to the incentives and redeveloped the centre. However, interviews with the IAP project manager and other members of the monitoring committee reveal that the redevelopment was a difficult and financially precarious one and it was said that Rowlagh was developed 'on a wing and a prayer' (Interview,

Project Manager). If we take North Clondalkin as a key sub area of disadvantage it is difficult not to conclude that the tax incentives were at best partially successful. Community representatives of Clondalkin IAP monitoring committee were quite negative regarding the impact of the plan and incentives in North Clondalkin. After almost eight years of the IAP they argue that the only visible improvement is that of Rowlagh neighbourhood centre. While they are in general agreement that this new centre is an improvement on the old one, they argue that overall the IAP, in terms of the impact of tax incentives on designated sites, has had only a minor impact on North Clondalkin.

3.4.3 Impact of Community Gain Initiatives

Sale of Council Sites

It has been somewhat difficult to obtain detailed information on the sale of council-owned sites in Clondalkin and Tallaght. Nonetheless, published figures were available on the level of investment in the IAP areas on projects that were a legacy of the EU URBAN project which ran from 1996 to 1999 in that district. In interviews with both Council and other members of the monitoring committees it was made clear that the extensive consultation that had taken place in the URBAN programme had ensured that many priorities in the two IAP areas were already established. Moreover, a number of infrastructural projects had been identified through the URBAN programme, which had supplied start-up funding for them. However, it was clear that there would be major funding shortfalls for many of these projects and consequently South Dublin County Council proposed that many of these projects receive funding from the IAP site sale mechanism to enable their completion.

Table 11 shows that almost €6.5 million was generated for investment in URBAN projects via the IAP site sale mechanism. In interviews some members of the monitoring committees expressed reservations regarding this mechanism. Although supportive of the projects themselves, they argued that separate funding should have been found to finish the URBAN projects and that the proceeds from sales of council-owned sites should then have been used to fund additional projects, newly identified via the IAP. In the event this did not happen and most of the proceeds from the site sales were used to fund what has started as URBAN projects. In addition to

the expenditure on URBAN projects, €833,500 has been allocated to small infrastructural projects across the two areas and €750,000 is being allocated to an improvement scheme at Rowlagh Village in Clondalkin. In total, the proceeds from the sale of council-owned designated sites is likely to reach €10 million.

Table 11 IAP Funding of URBAN Initiative Projects

| | € |
|---|------------------|
| Clondalkin | |
| Quarryvale Community Centre and All-Weather Pitch | 524,026 |
| Bawnogue Community and Enterprise Centre | 1,822,453 |
| Neilstown Youth Facility | 156,061 |
| Neilstown Childcare Facility | 134,993 |
| | 2,637,533 |
| Tallaght | |
| Fettercairn Community Centre | 292,318 |
| Fettercairn Youth Horse Project | 34,970 |
| Jobstown Playground | 12,619 |
| Killinarden Community Centre | 687,188 |
| Killinarden Enterprise Centre | 2,791,267 |
| | 3,818,362 |
| TOTAL | 6,455,895 |

Source: South Dublin County Council (2007)

Community Linkage Funds

If there is some ambivalence regarding the use of the proceeds from the site sales, there is clarity regarding the community linkage fund. As the community linkage fund derived from developments in Clondalkin Village and Tallaght Town Centre respectively, there is an automatic imbalance in potential impacts. Tallaght Town Centre is of a different order of magnitude in terms of size and scale than Clondalkin Village, the terms Town Centre and Village telling their own story. Moreover, in Tallaght Town Centre more sites were designated than in Clondalkin Village and these sites allowed individual developments which were far greater in physical size and scale than anything in Clondalkin. Therefore, it was likely from the start that the potential community linkage funding accruing to Tallaght IAP would be far greater than that for Clondalkin, and so it proved. Table 12 shows that by the end of the scheme it is likely that a total of €6.5 million will have been levied to the community linkage fund, with €6m going to Tallaght and the remainder to Clondalkin. It should be noted that these funds are ring fenced to the individual IAPs and no cross-subsidisation or transfers can occur.

Tables 13 and 14 give details of the groups who received funding and the amount of funding. The majority of funding was used to employ personnel, with some funding going on equipment and materials. As of summer 2008 approximately €90,000 remained to be allocated in Clondalkin while in Tallaght the final €5 million remained to be allocated.

Table 12 Clondalkin and Tallaght Community Linkage Funds

| | Clondalkin Fund | Tallaght Fund | Totals |
|---|------------------------|----------------------|---------------|
| Total funds lodged between 2001 and end April 2007 | €516,661 | €3,629,430 | €4,146,091 |
| Likely total Funds Lodged by end of Scheme | €534,000 | €6,000,000 | €6,534,000 |
| Funds allocated to date (phase 1 and 2) | €443,380 | €975,312 | €1,418,692 |
| Remaining funds to be allocated (Summer 2008) | €90,620 | €5,024,688 | €5,115,308 |

Source: Unpublished IAP monitoring Committee documents

Table 13 Community Linkage Funding, Clondalkin IAP

| Group | Grant (€) |
|--|------------------|
| Phase 1, 2004 | |
| Clondalkin Partnership | 30,000 |
| Clondalkin Women's Network | 38,000 |
| Cumas Project | 12,100 |
| Deansrath community College | 61,340 |
| Ronanstown Community Development Project | 30,000 |
| Mediation Bureau | 30,000 |
| Quarryvale After School Project | 1,940 |
| Clondalkin Partnership | 17,500 |
| Clondalkin Travellers Development Group | 12,500 |
| Bawnogue Youth and Family Support Group | 10,000 |
| | 243,380 |
| Phase 2, 2006 | |
| Bawnogue Women's Development Group | 30,000 |
| Clondalkin Local Employment Service | 9,600 |
| M.U.G.A. | 20,000 |
| St Mary's National School, Rowlagh | 30,000 |
| St Ronan's, Deansrath and Balgaddy | 36,780 |
| Dolcain Environmental Project | 12,000 |
| Dolcain Project | 16,500 |
| Ronanstown Youth Service | 28,280 |
| Ronanstown Youth Service Youth Studies Award | 11,840 |
| Clondalkin Youth Bank | 5,000 |
| | 200,000 |

Source: Unpublished IAP monitoring Committee documents

Table 14 Community Linkage Funding, Tallaght

| Group | Grant (€) |
|--|------------------|
| Phase 1 2004 | |
| Tallaght Travellers Youth Service | 35,000 |
| Jobstown Childcare Centre | 40,000 |
| Citywise, Jobstown | 40,000 |
| Jobstown Estate Management | 5,000 |
| West Dublin YMCA | 40,000 |
| Special project on long-term unemployment, Brookfield | 25,000 |
| Tallaght Partnership, TallZens Project, Killinarden | 40,000 |
| PARTAS, Brookfield | 17,000 |
| Tallaght Youth Service, Brookfield | 20,000 |
| Sure Start School Familiarisation Project, Killinarden | 70,000 |
| Tallaght Volunteer Bureau | 37,000 |
| The Shanty Educational Project | 25,000 |
| Tallaght Homeless Advice Unit | 39,820 |
| Fettercairn Youth Horse Project | 80,000 |
| Killinarden School Completion Project | 40,000 |
| Jobstown All-Weather Facility | 8,500 |
| Tallaght Foróige District Council | 10,000 |
| | 572,320 |
| Phase 2 2006 | |
| An Cosán | 40,000 |
| An Cosán | 40,000 |
| Fettercairn Community Centre | 40,000 |
| Gelenshane/Rossfield Estate Management | 10,000 |
| JADD | 13,792 |
| Jobstown All Weather Facility | 40,000 |
| Jobstown CDP | 40,000 |
| Killinarden Community School | 11,000 |
| Killinarden Local Education Committee | 14,000 |
| Pastas | 10,000 |
| St Maelruans Conference | 9,000 |
| Tallaght Rehabilitation Project | 28,000 |
| Tallaght Travellers CDP | 40,000 |
| Tallaght Youth Services | 7,200 |
| Tallaght Youth Reach | 10,000 |
| Westside Women's Group | 30,000 |
| Tallaght Partnership TallZens project | 20,000 |
| | 402,992 |

Source: Unpublished IAP monitoring Committee documents

It is clear from the interviews that the Community Linkage Fund was viewed as being successful. It was a new and untried mechanism but did manage to provide additional funding for many social and community projects, funding which would not have been available from other sources. However, some community representatives did point out that in global terms €6.5 million is quite a small amount given the needs of the disadvantaged areas. In addition, while the extra funding was welcome, it was, given the nature of the scheme, a one-off payment.

4 Conclusions

This report has highlighted the growing emphasis on involving the private sector in regenerating social housing estates in Ireland in recent years and has examined the implementation of the two key mechanisms used to achieve this, Public Private Partnerships and Integrated Area Plans, in three estates in the Dublin region.

In Tallaght and Fatima Mansions where these models were successfully implemented the research reveals a number of key benefits associated with their use:

- they generate a saving for the exchequer which frees up finance for use on other projects
- they have generated a significant private sector contribution towards the costs of social projects which might not otherwise have been available from mainstream (public) sources
- they have enabled the tenure mixing of target estates which has in turn helped to address problems of stigma and raise average household incomes
- in the case of Fatima Mansions, where the estate was demolished and replaced with a mixed use, mixed tenure complex, the use of a PPP has significant management advantages because it enabled the procurement of the regeneration via a single, rather than multiple, contracts. This also ensured that the design of this complex development was coherent.

However, this research also highlights some limitations to the potential for private sector involvement in regenerating social estates. In this regard the local and national economic and housing market contexts are crucial. PPPs are very difficult to negotiate in a volatile housing market, because potential public and private sector partners are unsure of how the market context will have changed between the commencement and completion of the lengthy negotiations necessary to establish projects of this type. The majority of the costs of the Fatima Mansions PPP were met by the private sector partner in return for use of a section of the site for private housing and commercial units. This funding model might not be viable in the context

of a stagnant or declining housing market, although in such cases PPP projects could be made possible by a larger financial contribution by government.

In areas where land values and private housing demand is low attracting investment in private housing and commercial facilities is also difficult. Among the case studies examined in this research Clondalkin is in this category, but the interviews with Dublin City and South Dublin County Council officials conducted by the authors indicate that this is also the case in many other disadvantaged, suburban estates in Dublin. In cases such of these, the provision of affordable, rather than mainstream market housing, would be a more realistic tenure mixing strategy.

The limitations of the potential for private sector funding of social housing estate regeneration highlight the continuing need for the provision of public finance for this work. Furthermore, the evidence collected for this study highlights the need for reform of the public funding programmes currently available. Interviewees from both the local authority and community sectors complained that these programmes are fragmented, overly complex, short-term, implemented by a plethora of agencies and focused too much on capital interventions. Thus two decades after the first regeneration of Fatima Mansions failed because it attempted to address serious social problems by refurbishing the built environment, and following radical increases in the funding available for disadvantaged areas, due to the restrictive terms of this scheme it remains difficult to establish regeneration schemes that address the real problems of target estates. This is particularly so in cases where achieving sustainable regeneration requires long-term revenue funding.

Finally, although largely positive about the role that tenure mixing can play in raising the average incomes of large social rented estates, addressing stigma and attracting commercial services, this research also highlights some problems associated with the use of this strategy in the target estates. Tenure mixing does not necessarily achieve income mixing if private housing is sold to investors rather than to owner-occupiers. This was a particular issue in Tallaght, where tax incentives encouraged the construction of significant numbers of new private dwellings, but a South Dublin County Council official reported that most was sold to investors. According to this interviewee: 'One of the fundamental things wrong with the IAP was how the

incentives were focused, that the incentives for investors were better than for owner occupiers'. Thus although these new developments provided high-quality accommodation for occupants they did not necessarily contribute as much to the regeneration of the target area as was originally envisaged.

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